Rethinking Tax-Transfer Policy for 21st Century Canada by Robin Boadway et al.
New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 163
Rethinking Tax-Transfer 




... licensed by the apparent support of authority and law, 
minimizing one’s tax burden rather than any notion of 
community burden-sharing has become the contempo-
rary ethic... Taxes are grants and the degree of their vol-
untariness is the measure of a society’s capacity to agree 
on collective purposes and needs, and to concur in the 
collective means by which they will be served and pro-
vided. (Stewart, 1986a,  p. 118)
... only if a strong majority of taxpayers can come to rec-
ognize that they have a personal stake in the success of 
the reform process, can it withstand the pressures for 
retreat which ultimately stampeded the federal govern-
ment into rejecting the principles and proposals of the 
Carter Commission. And only radical reform can restore 
1 I am grateful for very helpful comments by Fred Gorbet, Steve Richardson,
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a public commitment to the provision of public services 
and their financing. Equity, neutrality and ease of under-
standing may be principles of reform more capable of 
withstanding the assaults of special interests than any 
more incremental process. (Stewart,1986a, p. 126)
Contrary then to what might be called today’s conven-
tional wisdom, the reworking of distributional and redis-
tributional arrangements to sustain interpersonal equity 
and support might make a fundamental contribution to 
the easing and accommodation of the structural pressures 
of today and tomorrow. (Ian Stewart,1986b, p. 312)
TAX-TRANSFER POLICY FORMULATION was one of Ian Stewart’s many
responsibilities over the course of his distinguished career as a public servant.
His writing during a stint as Skelton-Clark Fellow at Queen’s University
while on leave from the public service displayed remarkable candor about his
views of the principles that ought to govern tax-transfer policy. Efficiency
and simplicity were important. But, more important, fairness and social
decency were necessary not just for their own sake, but for avoiding what he
called ‘share quarrels’ that eroded the social contract by which citizens vol-
untarily contributed to society. He shared this view with the Carter Commis-
sion of two decades earlier, which said “Unless the allocation of the burden is
fair, the social and political fabric of the country is weakened and can be
destroyed” (Royal Commission on Taxation, 1966, ch. 1). This led Ian to
argue for a fair and efficient system with a broad base, minimal tax expendi-
tures, and the lowest tax rates consistent with an equitable system. He also
argued for integrating social transfers with the income tax system so as to
achieve adequate targeting of transfers with minimal tax-back rates and less
demeaning needs-testing, and for maintaining the federal leadership role in
the tax-transfer system as indispensible for a fair and harmonized tax-transfer
system. Not surprisingly, he was a principal architect behind the introduc-
tion of refundable tax credits, arguably one of the most important innova-
tions in recent years, and he pursued other objectives vigorously, like the
rationalization of interest deductibility provisions. His approach was pre-
scient. The principles he espoused remain as relevant today as ever.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 165
Introduction
The tax-transfer system in Canada serves many public policy purposes,
including such diverse objectives as revenue-raising, income redistribution,
social insurance, social policy, equality of opportunity, retirement income pol-
icy and human capital policy. The broad architecture of tax-transfer policy has
evolved piecemeal since the days of the Carter Commission (Royal Commis-
sion on Taxation, 1966), with some episodes of innovative measures.2 Occa-
sionally, major reform proposals have been made for the rationalization of
broader aspects of the tax-transfer system, including the Macdonald Commis-
sion (Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects
for Canada, 1985), the Economic Council of Canada (1987), various targeted
proposals for pension and Employment Insurance (EI) reform, and the Mintz
Report (Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1998) on business tax
reform. Relatively few coordinated policy measures have come out of these
proposals. A rethinking of the existing system and how it serves its many
objectives would be timely.
There are a number of reasons why a major rethinking of the Canadian tax-
transfer system is warranted, apart from the seeming incoherence of the cur-
rent system as a whole. First and foremost, views about what constitutes an
effective tax-transfer system have evolved considerably in the past few
decades. This evolution is best captured in the recent Mirrlees Review (2011)
in the United Kingdom entitled Tax by Design, which is a comprehensive
review of the best principles and practices of tax design. It draws heavily on the
cumulative literature on the theory and empirical foundations of tax policy.
Although this was written in the context of the United Kingdom, its contrib-
utors were noted experts from around the world, and its analysis and recom-
mendations have resonance elsewhere, including in Canada. Similar major tax
reform proposals have recently been completed in the United States (the Pres-
2 These include tax-assisted retirement savings schemes (Registered Pension
Plans (RRPs), Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs), Tax-Free Savings
Accounts (TFSAs)), the Tax Collection Agreements (TCAs), the Goods and Ser-
vices Tax (GST) and the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), refundable tax credits,
the replacement of deductions with credits, the income-testing of various
transfers, and the implementation of activist labour market and various human
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ident’s Panel, 2005) and in Australia (the Henry Review (Australian Treasury
(2010)), though not as yet implemented. Indeed, attempts by the Australian
government to implement the mining tax proposals of the Henry Review, emi-
nently sensible as they were, precipitated the fall of the Prime Minister, indi-
cating how politically fraught tax reform can be. There is no doubt that the
time is ripe for such a rethinking for Canada, given some of the unique issues
we face.
A second reason for rethinking the tax system is that the world has changed.
Economies are more open to international competition and the mobility of
factors of production that entails. Labour markets have changed dramatically:
female participation has increased; volatility of earnings and job insecurity
have increased; skills have become more important; unionization in the private
sector has declined; pension plans have been threatened; the workforce is
aging; and the industrial structure has undergone fundamental changes. The
ability of a tax system designed for earlier times to cope with these changes is
limited.
As a result of these and other factors, inequality has increased considerably,
and at the same time, tax-transfer policies have become less redistributive, as
the OECD (2008) study Growing Unequal has documented. In Canada, in par-
ticular, redistribution has become much less effective, except for some seg-
ments of society (the elderly, children). The rate structure of the tax system as
a whole has flattened considerably, especially at the provincial level. Transfers
to the least advantaged have worsened significantly, with real welfare pay-
ments to the disabled and long-term unemployed falling fairly dramatically
over the last 30 years.
As well, budgets are becoming tighter as governments retrench from the
recent recession, as the cost of basic public services rise in relative terms, and
as the population ages. There are also new demands that are being put on the
tax-transfer system, such as environmental externalities, the treatment of nat-
ural resources, and the desire to encourage human capital investment as part
of an equal-opportunities agenda.
All of this suggests that the tax-transfer system needs to be smarter, and
arguably much more targeted than has been the case in the past. The purpose
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system that might address these challenges. This will draw on lessons from the
tax-transfer policy literature as well as proposals that have been made else-
where, such as the Mirrlees Review. There are unique features of the Canadian
economy that will condition one’s views, including especially the decentral-
ized nature of the Canadian federation, the reliance on natural resources and
the openness of the economy. But, the end objective of an effective tax-transfer
system is the same: how to raise revenues in the least costly way and subject to
tight budgets, while at the same time achieving redistribution, social insurance
and equality-of-opportunity goals.
In contemplating a rethinking of the tax-transfer system, we shall purposely
eschew political constraints, despite the experience in Australia. This is not
because political considerations are not critically important in carrying out an
agenda of tax reform. It reflects instead a conviction that the political process
can be best informed about the desirability of alternatives if they are proposed
on the basis of normative principles without being constrained by perceived
political feasibilities. Indeed, since political constraints are themselves mallea-
ble, limiting the discussion to what appears to be politically feasible in the
short term might unnecessarily rule out otherwise beneficial alternatives.
Concerns with the Existing Tax-Transfer System
The Canadian system of taxes and transfers has many attractive features.
The overall mix of the main revenue sources — income, sales and payroll taxes
— is fairly well-balanced, and the division of the tax room between the federal
and provincial levels of government serves the federation well. The structure
of the GST is efficient by international standards, and the HST mechanism in
place for harmonization with provincial sales taxes is reasonable, despite its
less-than-universal uptake by the provinces. The Tax Collection Agreements
(TCAs) for income tax harmonization have many attractive properties. Some
of the details of the tax-transfer components are well-conceived as well. This
includes the imaginative use of refundable tax credits, the system of tax assis-
tance for retirement savings, the income tax treatment of housing, some ele-
ments of the treatment of human capital investment and the public pension
system. However, several problems remain, and we identify them in this sec-
tion, in no particular order of importance.168 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
The Business Tax System
Problems abound with the way in which businesses are taxed. The corporate
tax system systematically favours some industries, such as natural resources
and manufacturing, at the expense of others. The structure of the corporate
tax invites distorting behaviour, especially to exploit the deductibility of inter-
est expenses. The system does a relatively poor job of taxing rents, which is a
serious drawback in an economy that relies heavily on primary industries. The
system also favours large, established firms at the expense of young firms,
especially those engaged in risky and innovative activities. Especially impor-
tant in this regard are interest-deductibility, the absence of full loss-offsetting
of risk, and the favourable treatment of intangible investments such as adver-
tising. Sales taxes remain an impediment to competitiveness in those provinces
that retain retail sales taxes (Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and
Saskatchewan). And, property taxes on business represent profit-insensitive
levies, which are not related to local business services and act as a deterrent to
investment.
Business tax problems are exacerbated by the fact that some businesses are
incorporated and others are personal firms. In an attempt to treat personal
businesses on a par with small corporations, so as not to discourage incorpora-
tion and to treat capital income the same whether earned directly or through
corporations, governments have provided preferential treatment to the latter
in the corporate tax system. This runs the risk of distorting the treatment of
small versus large corporations. Chen and Mintz (2011) argue that the small
business tax rate can deter growth by encouraging small size firms to form and
by discouraging firms from growing larger.
Especially problematic is the treatment of natural resources, particularly
non-renewable ones. Given that natural resources are public endowments,
revenue systems should aim to recover a reasonable share of resource rents for
the public sector in an efficient manner. The systems actually used are neither
efficient, as evidence of marginal effective tax rates confirms, nor capture a
reasonable share of rents for the public sector (though this share is consider-
ably enhanced to the extent that auctions for licenses to explore for natural
resources and leases to develop them are efficient). This is true of both provin-
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inces, and also the corporate tax system, which is a main way in which the
federal government can obtain a share of resource rents. Some resource taxes,
especially in oil and gas, are also subject to discretionary revision as resource
prices change, leading to political uncertainty that itself is detrimental to effi-
ciency.
The manner in which non-renewable natural resource revenues are hus-
banded is very problematic. Rather than setting them aside in a fund to be
amortized for the use of future citizens, they tend to be spent on either current
services or on the promotion of local industry. The result is an exacerbation of
the so-called ‘resource curse’, which does significant damage to other prov-
inces’ economies (Boadway, 2009). This is undoubtedly a consequence of the
feature of the Canadian federal system whereby natural resources are ‘owned’
by the provinces, but it has troubling consequences for Canadian public policy
that cannot be ignored in contemplating reforms.
Finally, the pricing of environmental damage, whether due to global warm-
ing, congestion or local pollution, remains very uneven. From a social point of
view, this is detrimental. As well, governments — including the federal one —
are forgoing a potentially important source of revenues that could be used to
relieve the burden of other taxes.
Individual Income Tax
The personal tax system pays lip-service to the comprehensive income tax
ideal of the Carter Report, but in reality it is a messy compromise between
income taxation and progressive expenditure taxation. Its structure is contra-
dictory, and it does a mediocre job of achieving equity, a task for which it is
uniquely suited.
The contradictions concern the treatment of asset income. Capital income
that is taxed is treated on a par with labour income, as an income tax system
would suggest. However, a significant amount of asset income is not taxed. It
is useful, following the Mirrlees Review (2011), to make the distinction
between two forms of sheltering: i) the EET system, which exempts savings
when they are made, exempts capital income as it accumulates and taxes accu-
mulated principal and interest on withdrawals, and ii) the TEE system, which
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lates and exempts withdrawals when the asset is run down.3 Savings for retire-
ment up to specified limits are either given EET treatment (RRPs and RRSPs)
or more recently TEE treatment (TFSAs). Savings in excess of the limits are
fully taxed. Housing and other consumer durables are treated as TEE,
although housing does incur property tax payments for local services. Human
capital investment gets EET treatment as far as forgone earnings are con-
cerned, but financial costs are not deducted.4 Instead, there is a system of par-
tially refundable tax credits that are limited in size and bear only an indirect
relation to actual costs. There is also the Registered Education Savings Plan
(RESP) system that implicitly reduces the borrowing costs of financing post-
secondary education. Capital income from unincorporated business assets are
in theory taxed as ordinary income, but this is necessarily done imperfectly,
and crucially, losses are not treated symmetrically with gains. Finally, earnings
from ownership of Canadian corporations are afforded some credit for corpo-
rate taxes having already been paid via the dividend tax credit and preferential
treatment of capital gains, but the crediting is very imperfect, especially for
capital gains.
The result is a system that treats different forms of capital income arbitrarily
differently. It differs from what theory would suggest, which would be for
either no taxation of capital income or uniform taxation at rates lower than
labour income tax rates. Many countries around the world have addressed this
problem, especially in the European Union, by adopting schedular systems
that systematically impose a different rate structure on capital income com-
pared with earnings.
3 The letters E and T in the acronyms EET and TEE indicate whether assets are
exempt or taxable during the three phases of i) asset acquisition (exempt from
the tax base or not), ii) accumulation of capital income (exempt or taxable)
and iii) running down of the asset (accumulated principal and interest exempt
or taxable). As the Mirrlees Review noted, these tax treatments are equivalent
in present value terms except to the extent that super-normal returns are made
on assets. We discuss this further below.
4 Forgone earnings are given implicit EET treatment since it is as if they are fully
deducted from the income tax base: one’s tax base falls by the full amount of
forgone earnings and rises again when the forgone earnings give rise to future
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The inclusion of unsheltered capital income along with earnings in the tax
base has another deleterious effect, and that is to compromise the progressiv-
ity of the income tax, especially at the upper end. An important factor in the
determination of the rate structure is the responsiveness of the tax base to the
tax rate, the so-called elasticity of taxable income (Feldstein, 1999; Gruber and
Saez, 2002; Department of Finance, 2010). One expects that this is higher for
capital income than earnings because of the greater freedom to change one’s
capital income by tax planning, relocation and outright evasion. If capital
income were taxed separately from labour income, concerns with high tax
rates at upper-income levels might be mitigated. Given that much of the
recent growth in income inequality comes from earnings inequality rather
than capital income, especially at the upper end (Piketty and Saez, 2006), it
could be argued that anything that makes redistribution easier at the upper
end is welcome.
There is a more general problem of eroding progressivity in the tax-transfer
system. Progressivity is determined mainly by the rate structure of the income
tax and the system of transfers to low-income persons. The rate structure has
become flatter in recent years, and this has been most pronounced at the pro-
vincial level. As the provinces have acquired more and more income tax room,
and have as a result successfully argued for more discretion in their rate struc-
ture, they have adopted much flatter rate structures than that of the federal
government. This has been partly compensated for by converting most tax
deductions to tax credits, which add progressivity to the rate structure for
those liable to pay taxes. More important, the advent of refundable tax credits,
which are themselves income-tested, has added a potentially important source
of progressivity at the bottom end by reaching those with no positive tax lia-
bilities. This has been of special importance for low-income families with chil-
dren and to some extent low-income workers, but the amounts involved are far
from adequate to address the needs of the poorest.
Transfers to Low-Income Persons
Those who must rely on social assistance, especially the disabled and
employable singles, receive what can only be called a pittance with which to
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credits, remain well below poverty levels and have been falling in real terms
since the mid-1990s (National Welfare Council, 2010; Boadway and Cuff,
2011). This is a national disgrace. Provincial welfare systems also have incen-
tive problems. Earnings limits are extremely low, and tax-back rates tend to be
100 per cent once those limits are reached. As well, asset ownership restric-
tions make saving unattractive even if resources permitted.
Federal low-income transfer programs have been less draconian than at the
provincial level. Transfers to the elderly through the OAS-GIS have been rel-
atively successful at lowering poverty rates for the elderly, and are well-tar-
geted to the neediest, despite complaints that this has reduced incentives to
earn and save. Tax credits for children have also been helpful, although their
targeting has not been particularly tight. The EI system on the other hand, has
relatively little redistribution built into it. Financing by payroll taxation is very
regressive, and benefits have only limited redistribution built in through extra
assistance to low-income workers with families and some tax-back of benefits
to higher-income workers.
Indeed, more generally, the decentralization of revenue-raising responsibil-
ities to the provinces has coincided with a reduction in redistribution in the
system as a whole, and it is not hard to imagine an element of causation. As
mentioned, the transfer of income tax room to the provinces has resulted in a
less progressive income tax system. Those groups of low-income persons for
which the provinces are responsible — the disabled and the long-term unem-
ployed — have fared less well than those for whom the federal government has
assumed responsibility — children, the elderly and the short-term unem-
ployed. Further back in time, when inheritance tax was transferred to the
provinces, they soon abandoned the field. There are exceptions to this, of
course. Provinces have maintained universal health care systems. Quebec has
been particularly aggressive with respect to children, though less so with
respect to the disabled and the long-term unemployed. And, the federal gov-
ernment’s record with the Aboriginal population has not been stellar. None-
theless, there is apparently some substance to the idea that fiscal competition
can lead to a race to the bottom.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 173
Indirect Taxes
The structure of the federal GST is sound, though the rate is arguably
unreasonably low, not just for efficient revenue-raising purposes, but also for
pursuing further harmonization with the provinces. Probably, one lesson we
have learned from the TCAs is that it is more difficult to maintain a fully har-
monized system the less tax room the federal government has. For better or
for worse, as the provinces obtained more income tax room, they demanded
more say in tax policy, and this resulted in more discretion over the rate struc-
ture and the system of income tax credits. So far, the principle of a common
base has been maintained. The argument is that the same issue could arise with
the GST/HST as the federal share of HST revenue falls relative to the prov-
inces’.
In the case of sales tax harmonization, the danger is that the integrity of the
HST system will be eroded as more provinces join in. Allowing a different set
of exempt or zero-rated products in different provinces complicates the sys-
tem unnecessarily. One lesson we have learned from tax theory, and one that
has been elegantly defended in the Mirrlees Review (2011), is that redistribu-
tion is more efficiently pursued by the direct tax system than by differential
sales tax rates. The system of refundable tax credits is a suitably progressive
complement to the GST/HST that renders further exemptions unnecessary
and counterproductive. Moreover, a system that has fewer instances of prefer-
ential treatment is administratively less complex. Whether the federal govern-
ment can succeed in convincing all provinces to replace their PSTs with a
broad-based HST is an open question. In fact, the HST system introduced in
British Columbia and Ontario has already compromised the principle of a
common base by allowing certain items to be exempt from the provincial por-
tion of the HST (e.g., children’s clothing, footwear, diapers and car seats;
books and newspapers in Ontario; residential energy in British Columbia).
More important than the HST rate structure across goods and services is the
fact that different provinces are now allowed to set their own rates as part of
the HST, unlike when the HST was first introduced in three of the Atlantic
Provinces. Thus, the rate is 13 per cent in New Brunswick, Newfoundland and
Labrador, and Ontario, while it is 15 per cent in Nova Scotia and 12 per cent
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unnecessarily complicated administratively. Operating a value-added tax sys-
tem in a fully decentralized way is a recipe for complexity and an invitation to
unscrupulous producers taking advantage of the absence of border controls to
set up schemes of evasion that are all too well-known from experience in the
European Union. Fortunately, the existence of the Canada Revenue Agency as
the sole tax-collecting agency for the HST mitigates the problem consider-
ably, but it remains to be seen how well the system can sustain different tax
rates across provinces.
The Quebec sales tax (QST) system is the exception to a harmonized system
with a single tax-collecting agency. Although the QST base is reasonably well
harmonized with the GST, both the QST and GST are collected by the Que-
bec revenue agency. This introduces additional collection and compliance
costs, and opens up the possibility of difficult enforcement at the borders.
What we are left with is a system in which half of the provinces participate
in the HST with its single tax-collecting agency, albeit with different rates and
slightly different bases, while Quebec maintains full discretion over its sales
tax rate and collects its own revenues separately along with the GST. This has
strayed some way from the original HST system joined by New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia with its high degree of base and rate harmo-
nization. The principle has now been established that provinces that join the
HST have some discretion over their rates and bases. Whether the extra
accountability presumably achieved from this discretion outweighs the addi-
tional administrative complexity now and in the future is an open question.
Equality of Opportunity
Equality of opportunity is a dimension of fairness to which all governments
pay lip service, and to which the Canadian Constitution in principle commits
both levels of government in Section 36(1). There are a number of policies
that have equality of opportunity as a rationale, such as public education,
health care and various constraints imposed by the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Refundable tax credits for children are presumably motivated by
equality of opportunity, the idea that children ought to have comparable
chances to succeed regardless of their socio-economic background. The same
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equality of opportunity successfully would require tax credits and in-kind
transfers to be well-targeted to children most in need. Although the Canadian
system of targeted transfers for children and for services for children may not
go as far as some would like, the basic structures are in place that can be built
on.
The case of post-secondary education is less clear. There exists a myriad of
policy instruments available both in the tax-transfer system and alongside it.
We have mentioned the implicit deductibility of forgone earnings, which cor-
responds with cash-flow, or EET, tax treatment. However, that is not as gen-
erous as it might seem since the rate of tax applicable to forgone earnings is
typically much less than that paid later on, given the progressive income tax
rate structure. This constitutes a disincentive to invest in human capital. Full
EET treatment for post-secondary education would also include full and
refundable deductibility of financial costs for which the current system of edu-
cation and tuition credits is an imperfect and inadequate substitute. In addi-
tion, RESPs seem largely to be a windfall gain to families who can afford to
save for their child’s education (Milligan, 2005), although it may be a nudge
policy for those who, though they can afford it, would neglect to save suffi-
ciently because of present-biased behaviour. One could argue that post-sec-
ondary education includes an element of consumption as well as investment,
and on that account should bear some tax. On the other hand, there may well
be externalities associated with education that work in the opposite direction.
More generally, human capital investment takes place in many ways besides
post-secondary education, such as training, work experience and so on. In
principle, similar sorts of policy considerations should apply to these other
forms, although there are undoubtedly difficult administrative problems that
would have to be taken into account in a more detailed approach.
A more serious concern from an equality-of-opportunity perspective is that
there are sources of market failures associated with post-secondary education.
Three are particularly important. One is that education is a particularly risky
form of investment, for which standard forms of insurance or risk-pooling are
inadequate. The second is that, given the difficulty of borrowing against one’s
human capital, liquidity constraints are prevalent, particularly for persons
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from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds who are both able and moti-
vated face the double disadvantage of inadequate resources and poor prepara-
tion to succeed. The current system deals with these issues mainly through a
system of government-backed student loans combined with a spotty system of
grants targeted to those from needy backgrounds or those with superior abili-
ties. Post-secondary institutions typically offer their own financial assistance
as well, depending on their resources.
The result is a system that is inadequate in dealing with risk and in targeting
the neediest able students, and that relies too much on educational institutions
themselves as gatekeepers of student aid. Policy instruments exist that can deal
jointly with risk and liquidity constraints, such as income-contingent loans or
their equivalent. Moreover, grant schemes could be designed that are more
effective at targeting those most in need than the mix of refundable tax credits
and student aid schemes now offered. Indeed, the structure of the recently
introduced Canada Student Grant Program could readily be enhanced.
One final area where Canadian tax policy fails to address equality of oppor-
tunity is the treatment of intergenerational transfers. Being born into a privi-
leged family is an enormous advantage. Life outcomes are influenced not just
by the ability of better-off families to finance opportunities both inside and
outside the education system, but also by the transmission of human capital
across generations through intra-family learning and skill transmission. The
hallmark of an equitable tax-transfer system is its ability to redistribute among
persons according to the advantages that they are endowed with through luck
of birth. The income tax does this on the basis of earnings and to some extent
capital income. Earnings partly reflect the advantages of parental well-being,
and capital income includes the return on inherited wealth: indeed, one of the
arguments for taxing capital income is precisely to get at returns to inherited
wealth. However, the benefits of inheritances per se are not taxed in Canada.
Instead, accrued capital gains on inheritances are taxed, which is a highly inad-
equate way of dealing with inherited wealth.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 177
Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review
The Mirrlees Review was initiated to mark 30 years since the publication of
the influential Meade Report (Report of a Committee Chaired by Professor
James Meade, 1978) in the United Kingdom. The latter, along with the U.S.
Treasury Blueprints (1977), represented an abrupt change in personal tax pol-
icy prescription from the traditional advocacy of Haig-Simons comprehensive
income taxation, of which the Carter Report (Royal Commission on Taxation,
1966) was the pinnacle. Like the Meade Report, the Mirrlees Review was writ-
ten by a committee of tax policy experts, but it went further in some important
respects. For one, it studied the entire tax system, including income taxes,
social insurance contributions, sales taxes, and excise taxes, especially environ-
mental ones. For another, it relied heavily on the cumulative economic litera-
ture on optimal tax theory and policy, and it grounded its recommendations on
thorough empirical analysis. And, its advice included not only recommenda-
tions for structural reform of the tax base but also detailed recommendations
about reform of the rate structure that were meant to be roughly revenue-neu-
tral and distribution-neutral. In effect, the aim of the Mirrlees Review propos-
als was to extract revenues in the most efficient way consistent with given
redistribution objectives and required revenues. While the context for the
Mirrlees Review recommendations was the U.K. tax system, it provides a use-
ful template from which to consider reforms in Canada.
The main elements of the Mirrlees Review proposals are straightforward
and can be summarized as follows:
• The proposed direct tax base for individuals was an elaboration of the
expenditure tax proposals of the Meade Report. The latter proposed shel-
tering of capital income using one of two methods, TEE (tax-prepaid) and
EET (registered), and would allow taxpayers some discretion in treating
their assets in either way. The Mirrlees Review added a third option, a
Rate-of-Return Allowance (RRA), referred to as TtE treatment. It taxes
the return on assets in excess of normal returns (the lowercase t), and
would be applied mainly to equity income: housing and interest-bearing
assets would be treated as TEE, while pensions would be EET. In fact,
RRA treatment is equivalent to EET in the sense that it taxes excess asset
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Mirrlees Review deemed this to be an advantage, despite the administra-
tive costs of RRA versus EET.
• Particular attention was paid to ensuring that the rate structure of all taxes
and transfers taken together did not have adverse incentive effects, partic-
ularly with respect to the labour force participation decision. The latter is
especially important for parents of children beyond infancy and above and
persons nearing retirement age.
• The corporate tax system would take the so-called Allowance for Corpo-
rate Equity (ACE) form, which is the equivalent of the cash-flow tax rec-
ommended by the Meade Report. This is a neutral tax system that taxes
rents, but results in tax liabilities earlier in an investment’s life than a cash-
flow tax. This is the analogue of the RRA at the personal level, and would
apply to unincorporated businesses as well.5 
• The other direct tax would be a tax on inheritances received over a tax-
payer’s lifetime, whether transferred on death or inter vivos. This also finds
its close analogue in the Meade Report. It would serve an important equal-
ity-of-opportunity objective, and would complement the fact that normal
returns to saving would not be taxed.6 
• The VAT system would move to a fully uniform one by eliminating
exempt and zero-rated goods and services, and accompanying it with
adjustments to the income tax system to maintain distribution-neutrality.
(Special treatment for financial services and housing would apply.) 
• Social insurance contributions, which give rise to various anomalies in the
overall rate structure in the United Kingdom, would be harmonized with
the income tax so that a single rate schedule applied to both. 
• A single carbon tax would replace the existing incoherent system of fuel
charges and would apply uniformly to all emissions sources (taking due
account of sources that were already subject to the EU emissions trading
5 As discussed later, ACE treatment involves adding all capital expenditures to
an account, applying a risk-free interest rate to the value of the account as a
tax deduction each year, and reducing the account annually by a depreciation
rate.
6 The rationale for such a tax is outlined in Boadway, Chamberlain and Emmer-
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system). As well, a road congestion tax would be applied nationwide, and
revenues from both environmental charges and congestion pricing would
go into general revenues.
We turn next to what we might take from these proposals for the Canadian
context.
Tax by Design for Canada
As mentioned, the Mirrlees Review proposals were devised mainly with the
U.K. tax system in mind. However, most of the recommendations have reso-
nance for other countries, including Canada. At the same time, there are some
key differences between the circumstances facing Canada and the United
Kingdom that would make wholesale adoption of the proposals problematic.
First, Canada is a federal country in which a significant share of tax room is
occupied by the provinces. This raises issues both of tax design and harmoni-
zation. It also raises important issues of coordinated policy-making in the area
of transfers to low-income persons, given the important role the provinces
play in that regard. Second, natural resources are much more important in
Canada than in the United Kingdom, and give rise to special problems given
their decentralized ownership. Third, Canada has no tax on bequests or inher-
itances, while the United Kingdom does. While in principle this ought not to
detract from recommending that lifetime inheritances be taxed, it would
involve a more significant reform than in the United Kingdom where a tax on
bequests, albeit very imperfect, already exists. Fourth, congestion pricing does
not assume the urgency in Canada as it does in the United Kingdom. Environ-
mental pricing presumably does, although important coordination issues both
with the provinces and with the United States must be taken into consider-
ation. Finally, for whatever reason, the Mirrlees Review paid no attention to
the tax treatment of human capital accumulation. This is unusual, given the
debate in the United Kingdom over student fees and student financing of post-
secondary education.
These considerations suggest that the application of tax reform principles to
Canada would likely emphasize somewhat different features than in the Mir-
rlees Review. At the same time, since we would draw on a common body of lit-
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the case for the President’s Panel (2005) in the United States and Henry
Review (Australian Treasury, 2010) in Australia. What follows is some musing
about what proposals a document entitled “Tax by Design for Canada” would
contain.
Individual Income Tax
The design of the individual income tax is critically important since it not
only raises the most revenue but also is the main tax instrument used to deliver
equity objectives. There are three main issues: the choice of the base, the
choice of the rate structure, including refundable tax credits, and the harmo-
nization of federal and provincial taxes. Other issues that we do not have space
to deal with include the taxpaying unit (individual, family, etc.), the use of the
tax for influencing behaviour, and international aspects of individual taxation.
The choice of the individual tax base is dominated by the treatment of cap-
ital income, or equivalently, the case for taxing present and future consump-
tion at differential rates. The theory poses the question this way: what is the
most efficient way to raise revenues over the life-cycles of heterogeneous
households so as to achieve a desired amount of redistribution, defined on a
lifetime basis, while satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint.7 The theo-
retical prescription is agnostic, especially when practical considerations such
as administrative complexity, evasion, and individual behavioural anomalies
are taken into account. We can, however, identify some broad arguments for
and against taxing capital income.8
One main argument in favour of taxing capital income is that in the absence
of a tax on wealth transfers, some persons have sources of purchasing power
that would otherwise go untaxed. This is the case under most bequest or inher-
itance taxes, which typically affect only the relatively wealthy and exclude
transfers other than bequests. In the current Canadian context, this argument
7 In the literature, matters are made more complicated by the requirement to
satisfy an information constraint, which precludes high-earners from wanting
to mimic low-earners. Moreover, the income tax system may be called on to
achieve intergenerational redistribution in the event that there are restrictions
on instruments of intergenerational transfers, such as debt. 
8 Banks and Diamond (2010) give a detailed summary of the case for taxing cap-
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carries considerable weight. A further argument is that high-income persons
tend to have higher preferences for saving, because they are more patient and
because they expect to live longer. Taxing saving is an indirect way of taxing
their earning ability (which is the ideal basis for redistributive taxation, for
which actual earnings is an imperfect proxy). Related is the argument that sav-
ing, or future consumption, is complementary with leisure, so taxing it is an
efficient way of indirectly taxing leisure, which would otherwise be untaxed
despite the fact that it, like goods and services, is a source of individual welfare.
More technical arguments involve uncertainty and liquidity constraints. If
future earnings are uncertain, so the need for saving is itself uncertain, taxing
saving will implicitly redistribute from those who turn out to have high
income to those whose incomes are lower. At the same time, if individuals are
liquidity-constrained, taxing capital income is a way of postponing tax liabili-
ties until later in the life-cycle when the constraint no longer binds. A recent
paper by Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009) has simulated the U.S. tax system
using an overlapping-generations model with uncertain earnings and liquidity
constraints, and has argued that a plausible optimal tax rate on capital income
is about 35 percent.
The case against taxing capital income is equally compelling. Taxing capital
income is administratively complex and not all forms can be included. Capital
gains cannot be taxed on accrual, so a corporate tax backstop is needed along
with a system of integration. Inflation indexing is a necessity; taxing the
imputed incomes of consumer durables, unincorporated business income and
human capital income are almost impossible; and in the absence of full loss off-
setting, investing in risky assets is discouraged. Since not all asset income can
be taxed, asset allocations are distorted. As well, despite the theoretical gains
from taxing capital income, these may be small compared with the distortions
in behaviour induced by capital income taxation. To the extent that saving is a
vehicle for life-cycle consumption smoothing, a capital income tax is a distor-
tion with very little gain in equity. Indeed, it discriminates against those with
more variable earnings streams. Taxing saving might also be considered as det-
rimental to the extent that saving is already too low for behavioural reasons,
especially saving for retirement. The less saving people do for their retire-
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It is sometimes argued that capital income should be taxed because higher-
income persons have relatively more capital income than low-income persons.
However, this ignores that fact that the rate structure can be chosen indepen-
dent of the tax base, and that can typically undo any adverse distributive con-
sequences of eliminating capital income from the base. In fact, including
capital income in the base may actually constrain the progressivity of the
income tax. To the extent that the elasticity of capital income with respect to
the income tax is higher than for earnings, especially at high income levels,
inclusion of capital income in the tax base can discourage progressivity. This
is an important consideration given that much of the recent increase in income
inequality derives from inequality in life-cycle earnings, and arguably a rela-
tively progressive earnings tax structure is a reasonable policy response to that.
Given these competing arguments for and against capital income taxation,
what are the policy alternatives? There is a strong case against comprehensive
income as the ideal. Even if one wanted to tax capital income, there is no rea-
son to tax it at the same rate as earnings. There are two reasonable alternatives.
One is the so-called dual income tax, exemplified by the Nordic income tax
initially adopted in Scandinavia that spread to other European countries.9
Earnings would be taxed according to a progressive tax schedule, while capital
income would be subject to a separate schedule, typically at a uniform rate
(equal to the lowest earnings tax rate in the Nordic system). Uniform capital
taxation simplifies the system by allowing for withholding by financial institu-
tions and reducing wasteful tax planning. It also satisfies the argument for
some capital income tax, albeit at different rates than earnings taxation, which
can be as progressive as desired. The dual tax does not eliminate all complica-
tions. Some asset income cannot be taxed, and policymakers might want to
positively encourage saving for retirement. There is still a need for the corpo-
rate tax to serve a withholding function, which might compromise its use as a
rent-collecting instrument, and which as mentioned is difficult to do in an
open economy in any case. Enforcement problems also arise in distinguishing
earnings from capital income in unincorporated businesses. And, taxing capi-
9 The dual tax was also one of the options recommended by the President’s Panel
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tal income at a uniform and low rate means that much income from inherited
wealth goes untaxed. For that, as well as for reasons of equality of opportunity,
wealth transfer taxes are a complementary policy instrument to the dual
income tax.
The second alternative is to adopt a form of personal expenditure taxation,
along the lines of the Meade Report or the Mirrlees Review. In the Meade
Report, assets would be treated in one of two forms: TEE (tax-prepaid) or
EET (registered). Some assets whose returns are difficult to measure, like
housing, would necessarily fall under TEE. Others, like personal business
assets, human capital accumulation and possibly pensions, would naturally
face EET. For others, taxpayers might be allowed to choose either TEE or
EET so as to average their tax liabilities over the life-cycle. In such a system,
if all returns to assets were normal, TEE and EET would give rise to equiva-
lent tax bases in present-value terms. However, to the extent that asset income
deviates from normal, the two will differ. Some assets might obtain windfall
earnings, which are only captured under EET. Others might be risky so could
earn either more or less than normal returns. In this case, EET would gener-
ally implicitly treat above-normal and below-normal returns symmetrically.
The government would effectively share the risk, and thereby encourage risk-
taking.
The Mirrlees Review adds a third treatment, TtE, which taxes in each year
all returns in excess of the normal rate of return, or RRA. They specify that
this will apply especially to equity assets, whose return is liable to include
above or below-normal returns. TtE differs from EET in that all non-normal
asset returns are cumulated and taxed when the asset is disposed of under EET,
but are taxed as they accrue under TtE. As long as all losses are treated sym-
metrically with gains, TtE accomplishes much the same as EET, but averages
tax liabilities over time and advances government revenues. The Mirrlees
Review makes no other allowance for self-averaging by choice of asset treat-
ment, presumably because the use of TtE makes income averaging less neces-
sary. TtE treatment does, however, add considerable complexity to the system
since it requires that both asset returns be reported and normal returns be
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Unincorporated business income could also be treated in one of two ways.
The Meade report recommended cash-flow business taxation, or EET in Mir-
rlees’ parlance. The Mirrlees Report proposes the ACE system mentioned
above and discussed in more detail below. It is the analogue of the RRA that
they propose for equity income at the personal level. Again, the difference is
primarily in the timing of tax liabilities: The ACE advances taxes but does so
at some administrative cost. What is critical in both cases, especially cash-flow
business taxation, is that losses be treated symmetrically with gains, either
through full refundability of tax losses or carry forward with (risk-free) inter-
est. Refundability has a further advantage in relaxing financing constraints
that young growing firms might face.
Among the three alternatives — dual income tax, Meade-style expenditure
tax, or Mirrlees TEE-TtE-EET combination — the Meade system with TEE
and EET alternatives seems preferable, provided it is accompanied with an
inheritance tax. The inheritance tax largely undercuts the need for capital
income taxation, and the Meade version of expenditure tax is less complex that
the Mirrlees one, while accomplishing the same thing. If inheritance taxation
is not feasible, the Nordic-style dual income tax would be a second-best
choice. In all cases, it is reasonable to maintain TEE treatment for housing,
especially given that housing draws property taxation, and EET for retirement
savings.
All of the above alternatives require that the government choose a rate
structure to apply to earnings.10 By rate structure, we mean not only the sys-
tem of tax brackets and exemptions, but also tax credits — refundable or not
— that exist for redistributive purposes.11 There is no unambiguously optimal
rate structure, given the value judgments involved. However, a number of con-
siderations influence how progressive the tax might be:
10 We use the term earnings, but transfers from government would typically be
included with earnings in the non-capital-income tax base.
11 Some nonrefundable tax credits exist for other reasons, such as to reflect costs
of earning income or to encourage certain types of behaviour (charitable and
political contributions), or simply to adjust the base (medical expenses). For
reasons of space, we do not deal with these, although they do raise issues of
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• First, the separation of the rate structure on earnings from capital taxation
removes a constraint on progressivity, especially at the top end, as we have
mentioned. 
• Second, in the Canadian context, extra responsibility is placed on the fed-
eral rate structure to achieve national redistributive goals, given that the
provincial rate structures are apparently bound to be less progressive.
• Third, progressivity is largely determined by what happens in the upper
and lower ends. At the upper end, two factors are relevant. One is that add-
ing a bracket near the top adds much less revenue than adding one lower
down (since there are fewer persons to whom it will apply). The other is
that the elasticity of the tax base is often estimated to be relatively high at
the upper end.12 This would presumably be reduced if only earning were
included in the progressive tax base. A priori, the effect of higher taxes at
the upper end can go either way. While there is a substitution effect tend-
ing to reduce earnings, an income effect should operate in the other direc-
tion. Given the fact that inequality in earnings has become so pronounced
in recent years (OECD, 2008), a strong case on equity grounds could be
made for adding an additional bracket at the top.
• It is at the lower end where real progress could be made. Given the accep-
tance and experience with refundable tax credits, there seems to be no rea-
son not to make all credits refundable. This would turn the tax system into
a proper negative income tax system and go a long way to redressing the
shameful treatment of persons at the bottom of the income distribution
who are not working. Indeed, the refundable tax credits could be made
even more progressive by conditioning them on family income so that
they vanish before middle income levels.
• The Mirrlees Review, following recent literature on optimal tax theory,
emphasized reducing participation tax rates for taxpayers whose participa-
tion in the labour force was sensitive to after-tax income.13 Three groups
12 The Department of Finance (2010) estimated the elasticity of taxable income
in the top percentile of the income distribution in Canada to be about 0.62-
0.72, compared with 0.2 in the top decile.
13 The participation tax rate is the additional tax incurred plus transfer forgone
when an individual participates in the labour market.186 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
were singled out: low-income workers, parents of children at minimum
school age and older workers near retirement. For the first category, the
Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB) is a suitable instrument, although as
discussed below, care must be taken to ensure that those unable to work or
find jobs are not put at a disadvantage as a result. For parents with chil-
dren, refundable tax credits for children could be used. To achieve both
redistribution and participation objectives, they could be conditioned not
only on family income, but also on the age of the child and whether the
parent is working or not. Thus, they would be most generous for working
parents of children from three- to five-years old from low-income fami-
lies. (Parents with younger children could also have tax assistance for day-
care costs.) This would involve a major overhaul of the current Canadian
Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS)
and Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB), which taken together are not
well targeted. For those near normal retirement age, for whom participa-
tion in the labour force is quite elastic, revisions to public pensions could
ensure that there is less financial incentive to retire.
• Finally, what is relevant for redistribution purposes is lifetime welfare
rather than annual welfare. Given that the income tax system is based on
annual income, this is problematic. One’s income in any given year need
not reflect one’s lifetime income. To the extent that one uses consumption
as the tax base, which EET treatment would approximate except for ser-
vices of consumer durables, the problem is partly mitigated if household
consumption reflects permanent income. However, this will not be true if
there is uncertainty about future income. To mitigate the problem that
current taxable income does not reflect lifetime income, a system of gen-
eral income averaging is both feasible and suitable, and should be insti-
tuted. It will be especially important for those with volatile incomes, such
as entrepreneurs for whom risk-taking is a characteristic. General income-
averaging is not without its practical problems, such as how to deal with
new entrants into the labour force or how to account for changes in the
level of taxation and public services over time. Any form of general aver-
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Income Tax Collection Agreements
One final area of concern regarding individual income tax policy involves
income tax harmonization between federal and provincial governments. The
current TCAs represent a reasonable balance of a common tax base and collec-
tion agency with some provincial discretion over their own rate structures.
Any new system ought to make it attractive to maintain the TCAs, which obvi-
ously means attaining provincial consent. There are a few issues that are rele-
vant here.
One is the importance of the federal government retaining a significant
share of the income tax room. Given the tendency for the provinces to adopt
less progressive rate structures, the progressivity of the federal income tax
must be largely relied on to achieve the redistributive goals of the tax system.
This can be done more easily the greater the tax room the federal government
occupies.
A second issue is that decentralization of income tax room to the provinces
has implications for the integrity and sustainability of the equalization system.
The more decentralization there is, the more horizontal fiscal disparities there
will be: given that provinces have varying sizes of tax bases, the more they rely
on own revenue, the greater will be differences in tax rates across provinces to
finance given levels of public services. This will make satisfying the equaliza-
tion commitment more difficult financially for the federal government, and
perhaps also more difficult politically.
Last, the integrity of the TCAs is more likely to be maintained the greater is
the share of the income tax room occupied by the federal government. The
TCAs were initially conceived in the early post-war period when the federal
government was the sole occupant of the income tax system. As tax room
devolved more and more to the provinces, pressures for disharmonization
increased. Provinces naturally wanted more discretion to set their own income
tax policies, and initially pursued that by deploying an increasing number of
provincial tax credits, deductions and rebates. Eventually, the TCAs were
reformed so that the provinces could choose their own rate structures and tax
credits within limits. The system has now devolved about as much as it can
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Business Income Tax
The current business income tax for both corporations and unincorporated
businesses is predicated on the idea that the corporate tax should be a tax on
corporate equity income. The rationale for this is based on the presumption
that the personal tax should be on comprehensive income. In this context, the
corporate tax serves a necessary withholding role to preclude shareholders
from postponing taxation on their equity income by retaining it within the
corporation. Given this rationale, a system of integration is needed to give
credit for corporate taxes paid when the equity income is eventually taken out
of the corporation. As well, interest deductibility is justified by the fact that no
withholding against interest is necessary: individuals can be taxed on interest
income as it accrues.
The design of the corporate tax to fulfill this rationale has always been very
imperfect. As various calculations have shown (e.g., Boadway, Bruce and
Mintz, 1987; Technical Committee on Business Taxation (The Mintz Report),
1998), the marginal effective tax rate — which is a measure of the distortion
imposed on investment decisions — has generally been non-zero, and has var-
ied considerably over industries and types of asset. Natural resource indus-
tries, and to a lesser extent manufacturing, have been heavily favoured, while
service and tertiary industries have suffered discrimination. Indeed, invest-
ment in some non-renewable natural resources has actually been subsidized at
the margin, owing to the excessively generous mix of deductions. The inter-
est-deductibility provisions also have deleterious effects. They encourage debt
finance, which as the recent deep recession shows, can be counter-productive.
As well, interest deductibility is a main element of the tax system that firms can
use to shift profits from one jurisdiction to another to minimize their tax bur-
den.
These problems can be largely avoided by re-designing business taxation to
be a tax on rents. If the personal tax is based on expenditures, in either the
Meade Report or Mirrlees Review senses, there is obviously no need to use the
corporate tax for withholding against domestic shareholders: the dividend tax
credit can be eliminated. Even with a dual tax, withholding loses much of its
rationale, especially in an open economy like Canada. At the same time, the
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an efficient source of revenues. Moreover, in the natural resource sector, they
are, along with auctions for the right to exploit natural resources, ways for the
government to obtain a share of the fruits of the nation’s endowed wealth.
Designing a rent tax is also much simpler than designing a tax on business
equity income. The simplest version is the cash-flow tax recommended by the
Meade Report where the tax base is simply the revenues of the firm less its cash
expenditures. There is no need for accrual accounting, for indexing, for inter-
est deductibility or for depreciation. Nor is integration with the personal tax
needed. The main problems are three-fold. First, one must decide how to treat
financial services, that is, whether to tax them on a cash-flow basis as well.
Second, there may be some enforcement problems with implementing a
cash-flow tax. Since taxes are implemented by self-reporting, the tax authority
would have to rely on the cash flow as reported by firms. Firms might have an
incentive to overstate their costs, for example, by exaggerating the cost of
inputs from their operations abroad. As well, self-operated firms might have
an incentive to convert labour costs into profits to reduce their tax burden.
The first two problems are ones that may prevent the tax from being perfect,
but are not significant enough to preclude using a cash-flow tax. The third
problem is that cash flow taxation typically leads to negative cash flows when
firms are investing and positive ones later on. For full neutrality, negative cash
flows need to be treated symmetrically with positive ones. Refundability is one
way of doing that. It is an attractive way from the point of view of assisting with
the financing problems firms might have, but conceivably refundability could
lead to fraudulent behaviour. The alternative is to allow firms to carry forward
their losses at a risk-free interest rate — risk-free, assuming that there is no
risk that the government will not honour them, even if the firm goes bankrupt.
However, admitting the possibility of carrying forward tax credits opens up
the possibility of a wide variety of cash-flow equivalent efficient business tax
systems.
A particular case of this is the ACE system, whereby a firm effectively is
allowed to deduct financing costs from the full value of the firm’s accounting
capital stock. More specifically, when a firm invests, it adds the amount of
investment to its accounting capital stock, and claims two deductions. One is
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stock, no matter how it was financed. The other is a depreciation rate based on
its accounting capital stock, which then reduces its book capital. Regardless of
the rate of depreciation chosen, this is a neutral tax. The tax is implemented
on a cash basis: neither accrual accounting nor indexation is required. The
only important additional information needed over and above a cash-flow tax
is the risk-free interest rate.14
The ACE system is the preferred tax system under our alternative personal
tax bases, and it avoids special treatment of small relative to large corporations
that are alleged to cause anti-growth biases (Chen and Mintz, 2011). It is
worth reiterating that efficiency of the business tax is only preserved if all neg-
ative tax liabilities are either carried forward with interest or refunded.
Refunding must apply to projects that do not succeed and go bankrupt. This is
especially important for the resource industries where the success rate in
exploration can be very low.
One final issue concerns the corporate tax rate. The proposed cash-flow-
equivalent tax would be a tax levied at source, rather than destination. Tradi-
tional source-based corporate taxes are prone to tax competition: lower tax
rates attract capital, but they also induce profit-shifting. However, corporate
taxes based on rent are not subject to the same competitive pressures as those
based on equity income. A properly defined tax on rent should, in principle,
have little effect on investment decisions and therefore on location. At the
same time, the absence of interest-deductibility removes one major vehicle for
profit shifting. That is not to say that profit-shifting cannot still occur through
transfer pricing, but at least it will be mitigated. This resistance to tax compe-
tition is an important feature of a rent tax, especially in the Canadian context
where the corporate tax is one instrument the federal government has to get a
share of natural resource rents, to which we turn next.
Special Case of Natural Resources
14 The ACE tax is a special case of the general neutral tax proposed by Boadway
and Bruce (1984). They showed that neutrality is achieved whatever the
depreciation rate used, provided the interest cost is based on the resulting
book value of capital. Bond and Devereux (1995) showed that the neutrality
property is preserved when the firm faces uncertainty, provided all accumu-
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The tax treatment of the natural resource industries is obviously particularly
important and contentious for Canada. It is important since natural resources
are a substantial potential source of revenues, and these can be interpreted as
the public's claims to the fruits of its endowed resources. It is contentious
because the provinces have an ownership right to natural resources. As well, in
the case of non-renewable resources, the stock will run out in finite time, and
an issue is how the benefits should be shared with future generations.
The tax treatment of natural resources is complicated by a number of fac-
tors. There is more than one policy instrument used to obtain revenues.
Rights to explore and develop resources are sold, often by auction. In princi-
ple, these should generate close to 100 per cent of expected future rents if a
competitive auction is used. However, this will be compromised to the extent
that there are other revenue instruments used downstream, that there is polit-
ical risk about future tax policies, and that the rights acquired are limited in
time or by stage of production. Provinces also deploy dedicated resource taxes,
such as royalties or mining taxes. And, resource industries are subject to gen-
eral business taxes by both the federal and provincial governments. Resource
production is a very lengthy process involving many stages of production and
possibly many different firms at various stages. As well, there is a high degree
of uncertainty, both about the outcome of exploration and, given the volatility
of natural resource prices, about future revenues. There are also environmen-
tal issues involved both during production and with the shutting down of
resource operations. We cannot do justice to these issues here. We focus
mainly on the application of general business taxes to natural resource indus-
tries.15
The rent-collecting motive is paramount in resource taxation, which makes
cash-flow taxation or its equivalent, such as ACE taxation, ideal. Thus, natural
resources should face the same corporate tax system as other industries. The
use of cash-flow-equivalent taxation implies that all costs incurred at all stages
of production should be expensed or carried forward at a risk-free interest
rate. There should be no additional deductions for depletion or interest, and
15 A more general treatment of natural resource tax policies may be found in
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no special mining allowance. Nor should there be a deduction for provincial
resource taxes against the corporate tax. That simply transfers revenue from
the federal government to resource-owning provinces, as well as creating a
distortion in incentives.
Since what is being taxed is rent, there is no natural limit to the rate of tax
that should apply: natural resources are not mobile. In a sense, the higher the
tax rate the better, since this is both an efficient source of government reve-
nues and a particularly important source of revenues for the federal govern-
ment given its obligation to equalize provincial revenue capacities.
There are, however, some design features of cash-flow taxation that are
especially relevant for natural resources. Loss-offsetting is particularly impor-
tant given the risk associated with the industry. Loss-offsetting should apply at
all stages of production, including at the exploration stage. A proper measure
of rent allows a deduction for all expenditures beginning with initial explora-
tion. Also important, but even more difficult for policy-makers to abide by, is
to avoid changing tax rates when circumstances change. If firms anticipate
this, and there is no reason why they should not, their investment decisions
will take it into account and will be distorted as a result. Being able to commit
to tax rates is obviously difficult for governments. It is one reason why advanc-
ing tax liabilities earlier in the firm’s production cycle is important.
The multi-stage nature of production also leads to potential problems when
different firms are involved at different stages. The cash-flow tax system
should see through changes in ownership, and ensure that cash-flow taxation
is applied over the entire life cycle of natural resource property acquisition,
development and shutdown. Taxing natural resources on a cash-flow basis is
more difficult when other industries do not face the same tax because it is nec-
essary to distinguish resource cash-flows from those of other activities. How-
ever, if, as we propose, all industries are subject to cash flow taxation, this
problem is avoided.
Special issues arise with respect to the provincial right to tax natural
resources. Naturally, the same principles of rent tax design ought to apply to
the provincial resource tax regimes. In addition, there are some other impor-
tant issues. The ideal division of tax room between the federal government and
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some right to ownership and the property rights that entails. On the other
hand, the federal government has the right to levy corporate income taxation
on all producers, including natural resource firms, and has done so for many
years. It is particularly important that the federal government have some
access to resource revenues, given its constitutional commitment to equaliza-
tion. The greater the share of natural resource revenues collected by the prov-
inces, the greater fiscal disparities will be, and the more difficult it will be for
the federal government to fulfill its equalization obligations.
Provincial access to resource revenues has some other potentially damaging
effects on the Canadian economy. To the extent that resource rents are not
saved, future generations are deprived of a share of the benefits and the econ-
omy is more prone to the Dutch disease.16 If the revenues were saved in a her-
itage fund held in foreign assets, as in the Norwegian case, exchange-rate
appreciation would be restrained, and the damage done to non-resource sec-
tors mitigated. Seemingly, provinces do not have the inclination to set aside
natural resource revenues for future use, despite in the case of Alberta the
existence of a Heritage Fund whose intent was precisely that.
One reason for that is the temptation that exists for resource-rich provinces
to spend their revenues on province-building infrastructure. This is a form of
fiscal competition that is likely to be inefficient from a national perspective.
There is no particular reason on economic geography grounds for industrial
development to be located where natural resource endowments happen to be
largest.
For all these reasons, a strong case can be made for the federal government
obtaining a reasonable share of natural resource revenues through a rent-
based corporate income tax that applies to all industries.
16 The Dutch disease, or resource curse, refers to the adverse effects that natural
resource production can have on the growth of an economy by attracting
resources out of more innovative sectors, by damaging export-oriented sectors
as a result of exchange rate appreciation if the proceeds of natural resource
production are spent rather than saved in foreign assets, and by perhaps
encouraging poor governance by making resource revenues too readily avail-
able for spending or wasting.194 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
Sales Taxation
General sales taxation can potentially fulfill three purposes: raising revenue,
providing a vehicle for decentralizing own-source revenues to the provinces,
and supplementing the income tax as a redistributive instrument. In fact, the
latter two roles invite difficulty.
Consider first the decentralization of sales taxation room to the provinces.
It is hardly arguable that the ideal form of sales tax is a value-added tax (VAT),
of which the GST is an example. By eliminating taxes on producer inputs, the
GST achieves production efficiency and also evens the playing field between
domestic and foreign producers. This makes it a relatively efficient tax, cer-
tainly more efficient that single-stage sales tax alternatives. The main detrac-
tion from efficiency is probably the evasion that the GST draws, partly
because of the taxpayer resentment fueled by the fact that the federal govern-
ment chose to levy it in a highly visible way.
Decentralizing the GST to the provinces, even in a relatively harmonized
way, faces difficulties. For decentralization to be meaningful, provinces would
have to be able to exercise discretion at least with respect to the provincial tax
rate. However, running a VAT in a federal system in which different provinces
charge different tax rates gives rise to both complexity and opportunity for
evasion. The evasion opportunities mainly arise from the absence of border
controls combined with destination-based taxation. This leads to input tax
credit payments at the border, which invites the kind of schemes that have
caused difficulty in the European Union (summarized fully by Crawford, Keen
and Smith, 2010). This can be mitigated by having a single tax authority as in
Canada, but the difference in tax rates across provincial borders adds complex-
ity nonetheless for firms that buy and sell in more than one provinces. In prin-
ciple, this problem can be further minimized by differential provincial tax
rates applying only at the final, consumption, stage, while having a common
rate of tax on inter-firm transactions, but this too is complicated.
An important point is that not much is gained by allowing provinces to
choose their own sales tax rates within a harmonized sales tax system. The
argument is that discretion to set tax rates improves accountability. However,
that argument is over-stated. Provinces infrequently change their sales tax
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given tax rate. Little is lost by not having the discretion to change rates. Given
that, the original HST system, whereby the participating provinces abide by
both the federal GST base and the rate structure, is by far the best approach.
The choice of the structure of the GST raises the redistribution issue.
Should some necessities be given preferential rates, including either exempt or
zero-rated status? The Mirrlees Review argued that the VAT should be uni-
form with no exceptions, even for things like food and children’s clothing.
Their argument relied on established, but somewhat technical, optimal tax
theory findings which said that if the income tax is chosen optimally, preferen-
tial commodity taxes are only helpful to the extent that they apply on goods
that are the most complementary with leisure (and these need not be necessity
goods). Unless particular goods are complementary with leisure, which their
empirical estimations indicated was not the case for necessity goods, redistri-
bution can be more efficiently carried out through the progressive earnings tax
system, including refundable tax credits. Put differently, it is better to elimi-
nate preferential treatment of particular goods and replace it with adjustments
to the income tax and refundable tax credit systems so that low-income per-
sons are no worse off.17
This argument is not entirely convincing for a couple of reasons. One is that
there may be constraints on the progressivity of the income tax because of the
possibility of evasion or changing earnings into capital income, or because the
federal share of the income tax is unduly restricted. In this case, some progres-
sivity can be achieved that could not be possible under the income tax alone.
As well, redistribution involves persons who are not in the labour force for
whom complementarity with leisure is not an issue. For these reasons, it may
be reasonable to maintain preferential treatment of some goods that are
heavily relied on by low-income persons, despite the fact that this adds some
complexity to the system. It is important, however, that the exemptions apply
to goods that are disproportionately consumed by low-income persons.
Given these principles, the ideal system would be one in which all provinces
participate in the HST (although Quebec is a special case because of its par-
17 The Mirrlees Review argued that there should be an exception for financial ser-
vices and housing, but that was not on redistributive grounds.196 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
tially harmonized QST and agreement with the federal government to collect
both GST and QST revenues), with a uniform base and rate structure and a
single tax-collecting authority. The tax mix could be changed in favour of the
HST relative to the current system, provided the federal government retains
enough income tax room to achieve its redistributive objectives. Under a full-
fledged HST system, the revenues could even be equalized before being
turned over to the provinces, as in the Australian case, rather than being equal-
ized after the fact. Ex ante equalization can be used to ensure that the high-fis-
cal-capacity provinces are equalized down, unlike in the current system.
The Equality-of-Opportunity Agenda
Most redistributive tax-transfer policy is motivated by the social welfare
principle of equalizing outcomes, subject to efficiency costs of both taxes and
transfers. However, equality of opportunity is a complementary objective, and
one that is stressed in the Constitution Act, Section 36(1). The meaning of
equality of opportunity is not clear. A weak notion is that all persons should
have equal opportunity to succeed, given their skills. A stronger notion is that
society should invest more in persons with lower skills in order to equalize
skills. We focus on what kinds of policies would be appropriate for the weak
notion of equality of opportunity, that is, for ensuring that persons are able to
make the best of their given skills and not be at a disadvantage because of, say,
socio-economic background.
There are a number of tax-transfer policy instruments that can serve an
equality-of-opportunity objective. One is the inheritance tax. The Mirrlees
Review recommendation for a lifetime tax on inheritances was explicitly moti-
vated on equality-of-opportunity grounds. The idea is that persons who
receive inheritances are placed at an advantage in life through no effort of
their own. The inheritance tax is a natural complement to a tax system that
treats capital income preferentially. Ideally, it would be a component of the
Canadian tax system.
Another set of policies concern transfers for children. Targeted tax credits
for children in low-income families serve to finance some minimal level of
needs of such children. On these grounds, a system of refundable tax credits
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ily income would be helpful. This motivation for refundable child tax credits
is different from that behind deductions or credits for child care, which are
essentially intended to facilitate participation by parents in the labour market.
(Tax credits that also target stay-at-home parents with children seem much
less justified.)
Related to both inheritances and child tax credits is an imaginative idea that
originated in the United Kingdom. Not too long ago, the United Kingdom
government implemented a Child Trust Fund, which was a lump-sum pay-
ment, or birth bond, to all newborns, with the accumulated value of the fund
being accessible after age 18. The idea was to make available to all children
some startup funding for any purpose, such as education, when they finish
school. The payment could have been targeted according to, say, family
income, but the government chose not to do so. The Child Trust Fund was
unfortunately abolished recently by the U.K. government as part of their aus-
terity program. The idea of a birth bond was partly emulated in Canada with
the Canadian Learning Bond. This is an initial $500 contribution by the gov-
ernment into an RESP for children whose parents qualify for the National
Child Benefit Supplement to the Canada Child Tax Benefit, augmented by
$100 per year up to a maximum federal contribution of $2,000. This is a well-
targeted equality-of-opportunity measure that could readily be enhanced.
Perhaps the most important equality-of-opportunity policy is education at
all levels. This takes the form of public schooling at the elementary and sec-
ondary levels. Tax-transfer policy becomes relevant at the post-secondary
level. There are two main dimensions to the tax treatment of post-secondary
education (PSE).
An income tax system that shelters asset income from tax should also shelter
investment in human capital. The simplest way to do that is by the EET
method: full deduction for all material costs of PSE (and other forms of human
capital investment) as well as the implicit deduction of foregone earnings.18
18 Our discussion assumes that spending on PSE is an investment whose returns
take the form of higher future earnings. It might be argued that part of the
benefit of education is pure consumption, in which case it should be subject
to a consumption tax (GST). Further, education is highly subsidized, so tuition
does not cover the full costs. This further justifies the progressive taxation of
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For this to be efficient sheltering, several features are important. The first is
that, since the costs of education are incurred upfront and the benefits only
apply later, full loss-offsetting is required. Ideally, this would take the form of
refundability of financial costs, but otherwise carry-forward with interest
would be next best. Second, since tax rates applicable on forgone earnings are
less than those on future increments of income, income-averaging is impor-
tant. Third, some of the costs of PSE are borne by parents, while the child
reaps the benefit. This poses tricky issues for EET treatment. There could be
some justification for allowing parents to deduct the financial costs of their
child’s education, with the returns fully taxed later on in the child’s hands. This
would be better than the current RESP system, which allows no deduction of
savings, but taxes returns from the RESP, which are then used to finance PSE
without a deduction. It is hard to justify such a system under either a personal
expenditure tax system or a dual tax system. As mentioned, perhaps one ratio-
nale for an RESP-type instrument is a behavioural one: to encourage saving
for PSE that would not otherwise be done.
Finally, there are imperfections in the financing of PSE. Many prospective
students face liquidity constraints that restrict their ability to borrow for PSE,
especially those from low-income families. As well, PSE is a highly risky
investment for which insurance is not available. To some extent, the taxation
of future returns provides implicit insurance: the government shares in the
gains and the losses. But, some uninsured component remains. The riskiness
of PSE investment combined with the fact of liquidity constraints can be
addressed by a fully funded income-contingent loan system. It would take us
too far afield to discuss the details of such schemes, especially in the context of
Canadian federalism.19 The general argument for income-contingent loans as
the preferred form of student loans is strong.
Income-contingent loans go partway to addressing equality-of-opportunity
objectives by relaxing the financing constraint that students from lower-
income families face. But it does not overcome the fact that some students are
able to take advantage of the fact that parental income is a significant source of
19 A more detailed discussion can be found in Beach, Boadway and McInnis
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support for PSE. Students from the least advantaged families face a double dis-
advantage in terms of background preparation for PSE and of being able to
finance it once they are accepted. For able and motivated students from disad-
vantaged family backgrounds, equal opportunity to pursue their capabilities
requires financial aid. The recently introduced Canada Student Grant Pro-
gram is well designed and well targeted on the basis of family income, but it is
really quite inadequate in generosity, and covers only a portion of tuition fees
(a maximum of $2,000 per year for students from the lowest-income families).
While it is supplemented by other grants from the provinces and the universi-
ties, the amounts are not really adequate for those least able to afford PSE. Tax
preferences are much less well targeted and comprise an increasing proportion
of financial assistance: in the past ten years, government spending on tax cred-
its and savings grants has climbed from 20 per cent of needs-based grants and
loans to over 60 percent! Education and tuition tax credits are available to all
households regardless of means, but because they are not refundable, their
value to the lowest-income families is highly compromised.
Social Protection
Social protection policies are those that protect the most vulnerable in soci-
ety, including the disabled, the injured and ill, the long-term unemployed,
low-income elderly and single-parent families, and those on short-term invol-
untary unemployment for whom self-insurance is most difficult or for whom
finding a job is a challenge. Many social protection programs exist, some of
which involve the income tax system, and some of which are delivered by the
provinces. By definition, these are needs-related and should be targeted as
such. The current system does a relatively poor job both of targeting assis-
tance to those who need it most and of providing adequate levels of assistance.
Moreover, the levels of support for many categories of poor have deteriorated
significantly in the past two decades (National Welfare Council, 2010).
Some target groups have fared better than others. Low-income seniors and
families with children have been served relatively well, while the disabled and
long-term unemployed have done poorly. The temporarily unemployed who
are eligible for EI receive reasonable benefits, but a significant number of per-
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repeat entrants into the labour force, or they run out of benefits if they face
structural unemployment. They enter the pool of long-run unemployed
alongside those who have never held a job. The long-term unemployed and
the disabled receive extremely low support, well below conventional poverty
lines.
At the risk of over-simplification, two sources of these problems can be sin-
gled out (Boadway and Cuff, 2011). One is that those programs that are federal
responsibilities (pensions, children, EI) seem to have offered better social pro-
tection than provincial ones (disability, social assistance). This may be because
of the greater competitive pressures that provinces face, though it may also
reflect that fact that policies for addressing the needs of the disabled and the
long-term unemployed are more challenging. The relevance of competitive
pressures affecting provincial redistribution is supported by the fact that pro-
vincial income taxes have become systematically less progressive than the fed-
eral one since the TCAs were revised to allow provinces discretion in the
choice of rate structures. The second source of these problems is that transfers
to low-income persons come mainly from stand-alone transfer schemes. The
income tax system delivers only a small amount through refundable tax cred-
its. As a result the contribution of the federal government to eliminating pov-
erty is minimal.
The income tax system could be a much more important redistribution
device through straightforward reform. Nonrefundable tax credits whose
intent is to add to the progressivity of the income tax, such as personal credits
and credits for dependents, could be made refundable. Moreover, they could
be made much more progressive by phasing them out with income, as is done
with the GST credit. This would be an effective way at targeting transfers to
the needy, and could be done in a revenue-neutral way. It would effectively
turn the income tax system into a sort of negative income tax system with pro-
gressive rates at the bottom, thereby addressing perhaps the most intolerable
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Conclusions
This has been a far-reaching discussion covering broad aspects of the tax-
transfer system. But, the main features of our preferred tax design for Canada
can be succinctly summarized as follows. 
• The business tax system should be reformed to be a rent tax applying to all
industries, using a cash-flow equivalent approach such as the ACE system.
• Ideally, earnings should be taxed on a progressive expenditure tax basis,
using a combination of TEE and EET approaches, accompanied by a life-
time tax on inheritances beyond some minimum. A second-best option, if
inheritance taxes are too difficult to implement in the Canadian context,
would be a dual income tax structure, with a uniform personal tax on cap-
ital income at a low rate. 
• Progressivity should be enhanced by a combination of fully refundable
and income-tested tax credits, and a more progressive rate structure,
accompanied by general averaging.
• A uniform personal tax on capital income at a low rate accompanied by a
lifetime tax on inheritances beyond some minimum should ideally be
deployed.
• For both equality-of-opportunity and productivity reasons, the tax treat-
ment of human capital investment should be rationalized by a combina-
tion of EET treatment for both forgone earnings and financial costs, an
income-contingent loan system, and highly targeted and adequate student
grants for students from low-income families.
• The federal government should retain a significant share of income tax
room to maintain influence on progressivity and harmonization. 
• The HST should be adopted by all provinces except Quebec, preferably
with a common base and common rate, though some necessities should be
treated preferentially.
The full details of such a reform would have to be worked out, but it is
important to get the principles in place first. Other elements of the fiscal sys-
tem that we have not been able to discuss would also have to be addressed, such
as equalization and social transfers, EI and pensions. What is particularly
important is that the tax-transfer system be highly targeted to those most in
need, and that the system be as efficient as possible.202 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
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